Tally Ho DAO - Flow of Funds

thanks for information .it was great .nice work tally team :rocket: :heart_eyes:


Establishing a steady stream of revenue that flows into the DAO is paramount to the sustainability of the project, IMHO. I have seen many blockchain projects quickly fizzle out after initial launch; without immediate revenue to achieve anticipated baseline initiatives token holders often exit. When building out long term project initiatives, ones that require ongoing contributions from members or managing project-paid third party services, DAO members can sometimes get “burnt out” especially if there is no clear compensation structure. With no clear continuous operation structure, why should a contributing member keep investing their time? And if project milestones are never met why should an investor retain their tokens?

By using our swap fee mechanism as the “baseline and inspirational” revenue stream we can immediately establish ongoing sustainability of the DAO. The approach of offering an attractive swap fee will always draw new users and keep existing users engaged with the product. Why not? you’re literally saving money by swapping with Tally HO, and savvy users will quickly realize they are also getting additional rewards that double dip.

Over time, Tally Ho swap fees may need to remain competitive, if other wallets drop their fees to match or beat Tally Ho’s fee, so too must Tally Ho. But even if our swap fee were identical to everyone else, a Community Wallet will always have the edge, because the wallet pays rewards back to users, rather than (for profit models) that retain these profits in a non beneficial way. I think our swap fee revenue stream may fluctuate over time, but it will always remain consistent and reliable to support the ongoing health of our DAO.

Using our baseline revenue stream to fuel the concept of “inspiring” future revenue streams by way of DAO proposal grants and bounties is the gateway to organic project growth.

When creating a new or ingenious DAO revenue streams is met with a clear compensation reward, it encourages individuals (both new and existing) to bring their ideas and contributions, and advance the product. Milestone vesting compensations are the final key, ensuring these individuals to follow through their conceptual developments, and complete their proposed contributions.

This article was very well written! The flow charts are especially helpful, great work on this!


Thanks. Everything looks great.


Agreed this is great.


Good economy. Swaps are our everything!)))


I am in support of the in-swap fee, I think it is a great way to attract people especially for those who are less technical and more likely to use it. We should make sure to focus on those individuals, especially as medium/high-power defi user will stick to defi protocols.

We should use some of these funds from the swap fee to generate another product, because like nico186 mentioned, we could end up in a fee battle, reducing fees until they become little. We should take our advantage to build a strong treasury and slowly test other products and ideas that we can create to supplement the wallet or separate products to diversify the treasury.

I think we should incentivize the pool for 6-9 months and review it, initially incentives are amazing but after a while they lose their attraction, so we make sure to keep an eye on how much it attracts by using dune analytics and such. Other larger protocols like Aave slowly steer away from incentives once they have garnered enough users and incentives do not always attract long term users.

I think this is a great post kris! Always a big fan of your write ups.


If there is a loss of the TallyHo DAO treasury for the use of funds, how should we to prevent such a situation or minimize the loss


As far as I understand, our project is currently the most socially oriented DAO model of all projects known to me, where the community is assigned the most significant role in decision making and distribution of income. I am sure that other projects will follow our example.


Could you elaborate a bit more on what you mean?


I mean that TallyHo DAO treasury will be used of growth/build/ops.
Of course,every proposal will be voted, but how do we ensure the professionalism of these voting personnel and ensure that there will be no losses due to investment mistakes.
I believe everyone have right of vote,and i trust no one want to be lost own money because own unprofessionalism too.


So all token holders will be able to self delegate and vote, or delegate their voting power to a delegate they feel aligned with.

The DAO also elects the pack leaders.

So I mean never say never right, I mean bad decisions could always be made, or decisions could be right at the time of making the decision were great but shortly after seem the wrong decision.

In the end of the day it’s all in the hands of the DAO, the DAO will be as strong as it’s members. And I’m feeling pretty good about where we’re at already with that :slight_smile:

Do you have any suggestions on your end?


Yes.That’s right “never say never”.
We can try anything.No one can promise own choose always right.
I mean we could have a mechanism of our invest,we can track and intervene in the process of investment.
eg.When we lost 20%or25% of our money in a project.We must have re-vote about it.This should be a defined process that should be triggered when it happen.We should action not be re-talk when it happend Save time,save money


Yeah so from the original structure proposal, https://gov.tallyho.org/t/tally-ho-dao-structure-proposal/455

The Elder Doggos play an important role here, among others, to signal cases like these early on and support in guiding the ship.

Secondly there’s this:

“Packs are funded by the DAO. The DAO allocates a budget to a vesting contract. The vested tokens are a discretionary budget for the Pack. The DAO can stop vesting and pull back remaining unvested tokens in the case of a recall.”

"And: “Grants. → milestone based vesting”

I believe this is in-line with what you mean, the DAO can stop vesting and pull back the unvested funds.

These are all intended to prevent and mitigate cases like these.


Yeah.That’s great.
The Elder Doggos should be the most important of TallyHo .We should be trust them.
You have give me the answer of my question.Thank you so much.
Wish TallyHo will become more and more perfect!


I have been considering tokenomics lately and ways in which a token can actually represent value to a holder. Mostly I have seen from tokenomics much of the value comes from voting rights and market cap. This makes sense as if you are in control of a treasury with a certain token that token has value. In this sense tokens are much like stocks. Company value goes up stock goes up etc. But too often that value is perceived more than reality. The real value is voting rights and control of the treasury for doggo. But often the larger holders control the vote, which means although smaller tokens have perceived value the actual utility becomes less. I have participated in a number of daos and as a smaller holder have always felt my vote really doesn’t matter very much. So then where is the true sharing of the treasury rather than just a perceived sharing. I would suggest two possible avenues. First that the dao use a quadratic voting process where votes are weighted by how many tokens you have. A person voting with one token would be fully weighted whereas the next token would be slightly less and so on until whales have influence but smaller votes still very much matter. Secondly, why not a real share of the treasury. Obviously the health of protocol and the product are paramount, but what if a small percentage of accrued funds were distributed directly to doggo holders once a quarter or once a year. Consider it like a stock dividend. This would make owning doggo as truly owning a share in the wallet and would solve the perceived (still important) versus actual value problem. Additionally because the dividend might be paid in another token besides doggo (which I would recommend) doggo has holding pressure versus selling pressure for the other token. This could be done more simply by burning an equal amount of doggo to a percentage of treasury but once again that value isn’t as clear as receiving a portion of the treasury. If Doggo is really community driven and guided, it seems to me that the token itself should represent this in all the ways it can. Just something to consider on the flow of funds and the tokenomics behind doggo.


Everything is great and I totally agree with it. Thank you


:star_struck: it is really good job, nice


:grinning: yes it is really so good my friend


You can really seriously think about it! I like ! :heart_eyes:

great, thanks for this update